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Abstract:  This paper concentrates on 
proposing a framework to implement the PKI 
enables security in XML documents, by defining 
a common framework and processing rules that 
can be shared across applications using common 
tools, avoiding the need for extensive 
customization of applications to add security. 
The Framework reuses the concepts, algorithms 
and core technologies of legacy security systems 
while introducing changes necessary to support 
extensible integration with XML. This allows 
interoperability with a wide range of existing 
infrastructures and across deployments.  
Currently no strict security models and 
mechanisms are available that can provide 
specification and enforcement of security policies 
for XML documents. Such models are crucial in 
order to facilitate a secure dissemination of XML 
documents, containing information of different 
sensitivity levels, among (possibly large) user 
communities.  
Keywords: XML, Web Services, Security, Public 
Key Infrastructure 
1.0 Introduction 
Recent advancement in XML and increasing use 
of World Wide Web allow users to use internet 
as a document sharing and hosting system, with 
certain security features. XML is becoming most 
prevalent means through which documents and 
data are encoded for distribution among users on 
the web. At the network and document security 
front, older security models, such as 
public/private key encryption model, do provide 
a set of core security algorithms and technologies 
that can be used as a wrapper over XML 
document, but don’t allow working within the 
document itself and managing the contents. 
Along with, these standards were not designed to 
support common XML technical approaches for 
managing content, such as specifying content 
with uniform resource identifier strings or using 
other XML standard definitions for providing 
hyperlink services within XML content [1].  
 
The best-known simplicity of XML is to provide 
portability of data between disparate business 
systems contrasts with the complexity of 
traditional and very structured Public-Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). A key architectural goal in 
the XML Key Management Specification 
(XKMS) is to shield XML application 
developers from the complexity of PKI 
implementation. It enables XML-based systems 
to rely on complex trust relationships without the 
need for specialized end-entity PKI application 
logic on the client platforms where XML 
processing is taking place, thus reducing 
overheads. 
 
To be able to understand the technology behind 
XML security there is a necessity of explaining 
some fundamental definitions. The second 
section of this paper defines some explanations 
of security and then the rest of the sections define 
the proposed framework to implement security in 
XML documents. 
2.0 Traditional techniques used for 
security of XML applications 
There are various techniques that are being used 
to secure applications that are using XML as 
storage or communication medium. All these 
techniques are wrapped over a XML document to 
provide security features and none of them can 
be embedded within the document. 
 
Securing a XML document with SSL/IPsec is the 
common way to provide security [2].  SSL uses 
handshake to authenticate a requester and 
responder with help of certificates. It also 
encrypts the exchanged data. SSL can only 
authenticate and encrypt a communication 
between two points. Requesting and responding 
to a XML based web service often takes more 
routes than just one, providing an adequate 
solution if the route of the message is known in 
advance, but this is often not the case. 
Additionally, SSL only protects the 
communicated data during its transmission. Once 
the data arrives to the end point, the end host has 
to use other techniques to maintain the security. 
 
For example if to points (A and D) with two 
intermediate points (B and C) want to 
communicate with each other, A has to go throw 
B and C in order to get to D. In this case it 
cannot use SSL to authenticate itself and D, since 
SSL can only authenticate between two points. It could use encryption, but this requires 
intermediates B and C to be able to encrypt and 
decrypt the messages in order to be able to 
process them. Another problem with the SSL 
techniques for XML Web services is that SSL 
authentication and encryption consume a large 
amount of CPU time and consequently the 
transaction process is slowed down. Imagine how 
slow and laborious it would be for a server, to 
process several requests at the same time. A 
consequence of the above mentioned security 
lacks could is that exchanged messages get easier 
to copy.  
 
IPsec is a secure format of IP. It consists of two 
parts, AH (Authentication header) for 
authentication and ESP (Encapsulating security 
payload) for encryption. IPsec is intended to 
provide authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality. This technique provides message 
integrity, signature and encryption of exchanged 
data, but lacks videlicet point to point 
authentication and the possibility to crypt and 
sign selective parts [2,3]. 
 
HTTPR is a protocol for the reliable transport of 
messages from one application program to 
another over the Internet, even in the presence of 
failures either of the network or the agents on 
either end. Traditional HTTP is a very insecure 
protocol, for instance it never insures the 
exchanged data to reach its destination. In order 
to secure exchanging, the protocol has to 
implement SSL or rely on underlying protocols. 
Therefore an effort was made to create a new 
more secure version of HTTP, called HTTPR [5]. 
HTTPR applies rules to make sure that all 
exchanged messages get to their target once and 
in the original form. If a message does not get to 
the target, HTTPR notifies the sender that the 
message was not received, and if a message is 
received more then once, only the first instance is 
retained. HTTPR provides definitions about how 
to encapsulate a HTTP payload. To achieve the 
same benefits as HTTPS, there is a mixed 
version of HTTPR and HTTPS called, HTTPSR. 
 
IP blocking is another method to provide 
security. The users and their rights are restricted 
by checking the IP address, where they are 
coming from. The web service provider can 
maintain a list with IP addresses, from which 
requests are valid. The provider compares the 
users IP address with the list. A problem occurs 
with this technique when the IP list grows 
phenomenally huge and becomes very difficult to 
maintain. Sometimes unauthorized access can 
also be obtained through IP spoofing. 
 
With the help of XML signatures, one can sign 
only desired parts of an XML document. With 
the help of XML encryptions, one can also 
asymmetrically/symmetrically encrypt parts of 
an XML document. XML signatures become 
useful in the cases where a part of system needs 
to be protected and other parts are kept open to 
public. 
 
XML signature contains information about used 
signature techniques such as hashing and 
encryption algorithms. With this technique, 
assurance is granted that data has not been 
changed. XML Signatures differs from ordinary 
checksums, through association between the 
signature and the key. XML Signatures can be 
done in three ways i.e. 
•  to reside the signed data inside the 
signature 
•  opposite to the above, the signature 
resides inside the signed data 
•  Both the signed data and signature 
resides a different XML file [4]. 
3.0 XML encryption techniques 
XML encryption ensures that data cannot be read 
by unauthorized users. Unlike SSL, this 
technique enables the data to be protected both in 
transport and on the user’s computers. This 
specification gives guidelines about algorithms, 
key information etc. XML encryption can use 
both symmetric and asymmetric keys, but more 
widely symmetric since these techniques are less 
CPU intensive and are therefore more suitable 
for larger data exchange. 
XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 
To be able to use PKI, a system that can handle 
certificates and keys must exist. XML version of 
PKI handling is called XKMS (XML Key 
Management Specification). XKMS gives 
guidelines on how to integrate keys, certificates 
with applications and guidelines about 
registration, revocation and updates. XKMS uses 
SOAP over an HTTP based network. XKMS 
consists of three parts, i.e. X-KISS (XML Key 
Information Service Specification), X-KRSS 
(XML Key Registration Service Specification) 
and Protocol binding specification [5,9]. 
 
In order to achieve high security these standards 
need to be used in conjunction. An XML 
encryption must be able to use signatures or else 
the sender cannot be trusted and the XML 
signature has to use XKMS to handle keys that 
are exchanged. An important issue to be 
considered concerning XML encryption and 
signatures is that, these techniques are new and there is not an implemented prototype using 
these techniques. 
SAML and XACML 
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is 
a standard that gives recommendation about how 
security information should be exchanged, using 
Internet. SAML gives guidelines on assertions to 
request and response messages in order to 
provide authentication and authorization. SAML 
shows how single sign on can be achieved when 
several web services are interacting. This means 
that a web service does not need to authenticate 
itself every time it needs a further web service, it 
can authenticate itself towards a trusted web 
service and delegate that it is authenticated when 
requesting for usage of other Web services. 
SAML can provide these adding XML 
assertions. SAML, like vice Ws security, uses 
techniques such as XML signature and 
encryptions. 
 
XACML is a set of rules of how authorization 
over the internet should take place. XACML 
defines the representation for rules that specify 
the who, what, when and how of information 
access. XACML can be considered as a 
complementary to SAML. When a web service 
finds a SAML element in the XML document, it 
processes the request by checking its XACML 
policy through PRP (Policy Retrieval PDP). 
SOAP-Sec 
SOAP, the Simple Object Access Protocol, is 
XML syntax for exchanging messages. SOAP is 
both language and platform independent. SOAP 
uses the same port as HTTP, and is therefore a 
common used protocol for exchanging data 
between networks. Since SOAP messages 
consists of XML code, anyone who sniff’s up the 
messages can see the exchanged data. A major 
problem with SOAP messages is that they are 
one way transmissions giving the consequence it 
gets easier to steal, sniff, and resent the 
messages. In order to overbuild some of the 
security problems in SOAP, a new technique was 
proposed by IBM and Microsoft, called SOAP-
sec. SOAP-sec enables message signing by using 
an added header to SOAP [5,10]. 
WS Security 
WS security specification was worked on by 
some major companies such as IBM, Microsoft 
and Verisign. WS security was formed to 
overbuild the lack of security that exists in Web 
services and also to provide a standard for secure 
message exchange, signing etc. WS security does 
not solve all the security problems and nor does 
it give a specific model on how web services 
should be built. It only gives guidelines. But it is 
important to notice that is just one specification 
in a row of others. The specifications focus is on 
SOAP extensions. 
 
The extensions provide authentication, message 
integrity confidentiality and signature to 
messages. The general guidelines in WS security 
are focused on Authentication and Encryption. 
WS security does not limit itself to a specific 
model or mechanism; on the contrary it has 
support for several models and security 
mechanisms. For instance, a developer can use 
software tokens as well as hardware tokens. 
Although, WS security has several requirements 
on system, such as: 
 
•  The Web service language must support 
multiple security tokens 
•  Several cryptography technologies 
•  Sender to requester security 
•  Transport security [6]. 
 
4.0 Designing of a Framework to secure 
XML 
An essential requirement of new security 
framework is that it should work naturally with 
content created using XML.  The overall 
objective of designing a XML Security 
Framework is to guarantee the aspects of 
integrity, confidentiality, authentication and 
accountability (key management). These aspects 
shall be taken as high level requirements to the 
design of framework and should be further 
elaborated to arrive at more tangible 
requirements. 
 
The XML Security Framework is designed with 
a goal to fit together the ideas of the XML 
Encryption and XML Digital Signature in the 
light on the specifications as provided by W3C 
into one high performance implementation. 
There are many technical reasons why various 
available XML based security providing 
standards could not be used together separately. 
All of the guidelines available on the web related 
to applying security in XML Documents are 
relatively new and are made specifically to focus 
on some specific aspect. Not a lot of work is 
being done on the integration of such aspects and 
developers find it difficult to incorporate security 
inside their XML based setups despite of having 
very robust set of traditional available security 
tools. The major goal of the XML Security 
Framework is to provide an easy way implement 
security in any XML based application in 
integration with traditional cryptographic 
techniques. XML Security Framework is intended to 
introduce security in XML applications or web 
services. The framework make use of available 
native XML technologies as discussed earlier but 
gives a consistent singular API/Design to 
developers to introduce security into their 
applications. 
4.1 Components of Framework 
The Framework defines the security system in 
forms of components. These components will be 
independent and will be providing atomic 
operations that are needed while implementing a 
secure XML based application. The components 
should be designed with respect to the level they 
are categorized into, such as level 1 and level 2 
components. 
 
At the first layer are level 1 components, 
consisting of all the basic level functionality that 
is required by any security systems. The level 1 
components will give an interface to the next 
level components to use the traditionally 
available methods for security and also provide 
XML parsing capabilities to the higher level 
components, such as parsers, request / response 
management components and inter-
communication components. 
 
The level 2 components are XML 
transformations components, key management 
components, encryption/decryption components, 
signature/validation components and access 
control components, forming the core of the 
framework. These components will be providing 
the methods and their implementations that are 
defined or outlined in the various XML security 
related specifications provided by the W3C. 
There is one very important consideration of 
these components that is they will be talking 
XML as input and after successful operation the 
output will also be an XML document. Thus a 
true XML developer will be enjoying the fun of 
using XML and also making the framework 
conforming to one of property of XML 
documents i.e. XML in and XML out. All the 
information is in XML format. 
 
There will be a two way flow of XML data 
inside the framework. One way the XML data 
will move to get secure and as it moves towards 
the end the relevant security assertions are 
inserted over it and when it gets out, the resultant 
XML will be a perfect secure XML following all 
the standard XML security standards. The other 
way in, will be the secure XML document and its 
output will be the XML that would be extracted 
as the result of applying the various XML 
security assertions or access control policies. A 
simple flow diagram is shown in figure 1.  
 
 
 
4.1.1 XML Encryption and Signing 
Component 
In the Encryption and Signing process, there can 
be a possible need of counter signature, or partial 
encryption, the framework proposes that it is 
better to performs signature or encryption by 
processing input XML along with a 
stencil/template that specifies a signature or 
encryption skeleton, the way to use 
transformation component, the usage methods 
for traditional cryptographic/algorithms 
components, and the way to interface with XML 
key management component for key selection 
process. This stencil document will be an XML 
document itself with same in structure as the 
desired result but some of the nodes will be left 
empty and will be filled by the XML 
encryption/signature components after 
performing relevant computations. XML 
Security Frameworks gets the key for 
signature/encryption from the key managers in 
the key management component using the 
information from the stencil document, does 
necessary computations and puts the results in 
empty nodes of the given stencil, as shown in 
figure 2. Signature or encryption component 
controls the whole process and stores the 
required temporary data. Since the Stencil 
information is also a XML file, it might be 
created in advance and saved in a file and can be 
given to the application as an input otherwise the 
security framework API will have to generate a 
stencil by itself gathering information by itself. 
This logic allows application to create stencils 
without using XML Security Framework 
functions. Also in some cases stencil should be 
inserted in the signed or encrypted data (for 
example, if you want to create an enveloped or 
enveloping signature). Signature verification and 
data decryption do not require template because 
all the necessary information is provided in the 
signed or encrypted document  (fig 4)[7]. 
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Figure 2: Signing or Encryption module 
4.1.2 XML Transformation Component 
XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption 
standards are very flexible and provide an XML 
developer many different ways to sign or encrypt 
any part or even parts of an XML document. The 
key for such great flexibility is the transforms 
model defined by these specifications. 
Specifications define transform as a method of 
pre-processing binary or XML data before digest 
or signature calculation/verification. XML 
Security Framework extends this definition and 
names "transform" any operation performed on 
the data: reading data from an URI, XML 
parsing, XML transformation, calculation digest, 
encrypting or decrypting. Each transform 
provides at least one of the following callbacks: 
"push binary", "push XML", "pop binary" or 
"pop XML". 
 
In order to simplify transforms development, 
additional "execute" callback is added. This 
callback updates internal transform buffers and is 
used by the "default" XML/binary push and pop 
callbacks, as shown in figure 3. For example, 
most of the crypto transforms could be 
implemented by just implementing one "execute" 
callback. However, in some cases using push/pop 
callbacks is more efficient. When necessary, 
XML Security Framework constructs a 
transforms chain as specified in the template or 
document and processes data by "pushing" or 
"popping" through the chain. For example, then 
binary data chunk is pushed through a binary-to-
binary transform, it processes this chunk and 
pushes the result to the next transform in the 
chain. The following transforms chain might be 
constructed during digest calculation. 
 
 
Fig 3: Transformational Flow Diagram 
 
The XML Security Framework transforms 
engine makes sure that output data type (binary 
or XML) of previous transform matches the input 
data type of the next transform by inserting XML  
Figure 4: Decryption or Verification Module 
 
parser or default C14N  when necessary [8]. 
Custom transforms could be added by the crypto 
plug-in or application at any time.  
4.1.3 Key Management Component 
A key in XML Security Framework is a 
representation of the <dsig: KeyInfo/> element 
and consist of several key data objects. The 
"value" key data usually contains raw key 
material (or handlers to key material) required to 
execute particular crypto transform. Other key 
data objects may contain any additional 
information about the key. All the key data 
objects in the key are associated with the same 
key material. For example, if a DSA key material 
has both an X509 certificate and a PGP data 
associated with it then such a key can have a 
DSA key "value" and two key data objects for 
X509 certificate and PGP key data, shown in 
figure 5. XML Security Framework has several 
"invisible" key data classes. These classes never 
show up in the keys data list of a key but are 
used for <dsig:KeyInfo/> children processing 
(<dsig:KeyName/>, <dsig:EncryptedKey/>, ...). 
As with transforms, application might add any 
new key data objects or replace the default ones.  
Key Managers 
Processing some of the key data objects require 
additional information which is global across the 
application (or in the particular area of the 
application). For example, X509 certificates 
processing require a common list of trusted 
certificates to be available. XML Security 
Framework keeps all the common information 
for key data processing in a a collection of key 
data stores called "keys manager":  
Figure 5: Key Information framework Structure 
 
 
 
Keys manager has a special "keys store" which 
lists the keys known to the application. This 
"keys store" is used by XML Security 
Framework to lookup keys by name, type and 
crypto algorithm (for example, during <dsig: 
KeyName/> processing). The XML Security 
Framework provides default "flat list" based 
implementation of a simple keys store. The 
application can replace it with any other keys 
store (for example, based on an SQL database). 
Keys manager is the only of component in Level 
2 of the XML Security Framework which is 
supposed to be shared by many different 
components. Usually keys manager is initialized 
once at the application startup and later is used 
by XML Security Framework routines in "read-
only" mode. If application or crypto functions 
need to modify any of the key data stores inside 
keys manager then proper synchronization must 
be implemented. In the same time, application 
can create a new keys manager each time it needs 
to perform XML signature, verification, 
encryption or decryption. 
Inter-Process Communication Component 
Application may control XML Security 
Framework engines behavior using several 
context objects. New context objects are created 
for each operation and could not be reused. XML 
Security Framework also uses context objects to 
store temporary data and return additional 
information to the application. 
5.0 Summary 
This concluded the high/middle level design of 
the framework, there are a lot of issues will come 
during the exact implantation of the framework. 
A portion of the framework is currently being 
implemented. There is still a lot that can be done 
on this framework. The features of the 
framework that are lacking to be discussed in this 
paper are access control component and digital 
rights protection component.  
 
The XML Security framework is not the exact 
solution to the problems of XML based security, 
but it is basically to show the way of how all the 
various available methods of implementing 
security can fit together to provide what is 
actually needed. In Future this framework will 
improve as implementation will be done 
completely and as maturity level increase it may 
one day can act as the exact solution. 
 
The planned future work for this paper is to 
implement the framework up to its current status 
and then apply various software testing schemes 
to make the implementation mature, efficient and 
reliable. Other research oriented areas in relation 
to this paper can be the up gradation of the 
framework to satisfy the upcoming security 
needs like Access Control and Rights 
Management and also improving the already 
implemented models. 
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